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1  | INTRODUC TION
Mutualisms are interactions between species that confer benefit to 
both partners (Boucher, James, & Keeler, 1982). Although mutual-
isms are ubiquitous, persistent, and critical, evolutionary theory pre-
dicts that in the absence of stabilizing mechanisms (Heath & Tiffin, 
2009) or perfectly aligned partner fitness (Friesen, 2012), every 
reciprocal partnership is susceptible to exploitation (Yu, 2001). If 
multiple symbionts obtain some good from a host via a mutualistic 
interaction, selection would favor symbionts that provide reduced 
benefit in exchange for the good and thus incur less cost while re-
ceiving full benefit (Yu, 2001). Such exploitation of the mutualistic 
system, in which “cheaters” take advantage of the mutualism, should 
result in its inevitable collapse (Kiers & Denison, 2008). Empirically, 
however, cheating does not pose a strong threat to the persistence 
of mutualisms (Jones et al., 2015): Horizontal mutualisms are sta-
ble, and cheating does not necessarily lead to the collapse of sym-
biotic associations. Rather, stable associations of mutualists and 
cheaters can persist, even over long spans of evolutionary time 
(Ferriere, Bronstein, Rinaldi, Law, & Gauduchon, 2002; Sachs & 
Simms, 2006). Cheating has been documented in multiple types of 
mutualistic systems, such as plant–pollinator interactions (Jandér & 
Herre, 2010) and plant–microbial mutualisms. For instance, bacte-
rial rhizobia cheaters may form ineffective nodules on plant roots, 
exploiting plant carbon without providing nitrogen to the plant in 
return (Kiers, Rousseau, West, & Denison, 2003). Moreover, geno-
types of rhizobia that confer less host benefit have also been shown 
to be more fit than more cooperative genotypes (Porter & Simms, 
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Abstract
Plants engage in multiple root symbioses that offer varying degrees of benefit. We 
asked how variation in partner quality persists using a resource- ratio model of popu-
lation growth. We considered the plant’s ability to preferentially allocate carbon to 
mutualists and competition for plant carbon between mutualist and nonmutualist 
symbionts. We treated carbon as two nutritionally interchangeable, but temporally 
separated, resources—carbon allocated indiscriminately for the construction of the 
symbiosis, and carbon preferentially allocated to the mutualist after symbiosis estab-
lishment and assessment. This approach demonstrated that coexistence of mutual-
ists and nonmutualists is possible when fidelity of the plant to the mutualist and the 
cost of mutualism mediate resource competition. Furthermore, it allowed us to trace 
symbiont population dynamics given varying degrees of carbon allocation. 
Specifically, coexistence occurs at intermediate levels of preferential allocation. Our 
findings are consistent with previous empirical studies as well the application of bio-
logical market theory to plantroot symbioses.
K E Y W O R D S
biological market theory, cheating, preferential allocation, resource competition, species 
coexistence
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2014). Mycorrhizal fungi also vary in benefit and may even adopt a 
conditional parasitic lifestyle, sequestering plant carbon without re-
ciprocating with phosphorous provision (Johnson, Graham, & Smith, 
1997). The diversity and frequency of cheating in these systems 
have led to a classic paradox: How do mutualistic plant–root symbi-
ont interactions persist in the face of exploitation?
A growing body of evidence suggests that plants can prefer-
entially allocate resources to more mutualistic partners (Bever, 
Richardson, Lawrence, Holmes, & Watson, 2009; Jandér & Herre, 
2016; Ji & Bever, 2016; Kiers et al., 2011; Zheng, Ji, Zhang, Zhang, 
& Bever, 2015). Preferential allocation, like sanctions, encourages 
honest partners and selects against cheaters (Bever, 2015), but this 
could potentially erode the variation upon which such selection op-
erates (Foster & Kokko, 2006). Thus, given preferential allocation, 
why do cheaters not go extinct? This question has prompted a more 
modern iteration of the paradox of mutualism, asking what maintains 
variation for partner quality in mutualisms (Foster & Kokko, 2006; 
Heath & Stinchcombe, 2014). Several solutions to this new paradox 
have recently been proposed. Friesen and Mathias (2010) showed 
that higher coinfection rates by symbionts increase the potential 
for symbiont diversification by increasing social conflict, in which 
more effective symbionts are exploited by less effective symbionts. 
Steidinger and Bever (2014) suggested that the cost to discriminate 
against cheaters generates negative community feedback, pro-
moting hosts that do not discriminate. Moeller and Neubert (2015) 
found that when environments are variable, plants may invest in low- 
quality partners in response to diminishing returns on investments 
in high- quality partners, which also maintains cheaters and mutual-
ists. Bever (2015) identified that negative physiological feedbacks 
for nutritional mutualists allow cheaters and mutualists to coexist. 
Steidinger and Bever (2016) demonstrated that mixed colonization 
of modules (e.g., rhizobia nodules) permits coexistence of mutualist 
and exploiter partners, even with host discrimination. Most recently, 
Yoder and Tiffin (2017) suggested that incorporating host recogni-
tion of symbiont signals alongside host sanctions against ineffective 
partners maintains variation. Thus, our understanding of potential 
mechanisms by which variation in partner quality may be maintained 
in plant–root symbiont mutualisms is rapidly increasing.
In this article, we identify another, and perhaps more common, 
stabilizing mechanism of root mutualisms: symbiont competition for 
different types of host carbon. In order to more fully understand the 
maintenance of partner variation in plantroot symbioses, we must 
recognize exploitation competition as an important factor in this dy-
namic (Ferrière, Gauduchon, & Bronstein, 2007; Jones, Bronstein, 
& Ferrière, 2012). For instance, Ferrière et al. (2007) demonstrated 
that mutualisms are better able to persist when more beneficial part-
ners enjoy a competitive advantage over more exploitative partners. 
Moreover, we explore the consequences of the fact that, in the ab-
sence of honest indicators of symbiont quality, hosts must initially 
construct sites of symbiosis and invest in their symbionts prior to 
assessing their effectiveness (Bever, 2015). Thus, carbon allocation 
comes in two basic forms: that which is indiscriminately allocated to-
ward root growth and to initiate the establishment and assessment 
of root symbioses and that which is then preferentially allocated to 
a mutualist partner. For example, Ji and Bever (2016) estimated that 
while 25% of total plant fixed carbon is preferentially allocated to 
a beneficial mycorrhizal fungus in exchange for soil phosphorous, 
there is low but consistent proportion of fixed carbon that plants 
indiscriminately allocate to roots and their symbionts that is avail-
able to nonbeneficial symbionts, even with spatial structure (Bever 
et al., 2009). Here, we examine the conditions in which the presence 
of these two forms of host investment can contribute to symbiont 
coexistence.
2  | THE MODEL
We build from the framework of Bever (2015), which predicts the 
coexistence of a more beneficial and less beneficial root symbiont 
(designated as the mutualist (M) and nonmutualist (N), respectively), 
even in the face of considerable costs to the mutualist of provision-
ing the host plant with nutrients. In that model, these costs are 
overcome by incorporating physiological plasticity of plants to pref-
erentially allocate carbon (C) to the mutualist. In essence, the mutual-
ist and the nonmutualist are thus competing for carbon allocated by 
a shared host plant. Carbon allocation to each competitor depends 
on the fidelity (f) of the plant to the mutualist. Fidelity to the mutual-
ist likely depends upon the spatial structure of the microbial commu-
nity (greater spatial structure leads to greater fidelity), and the ability 
of the plant to preferentially allocate resources to more mutualistic 
associates in the absence of spatial structure. Additionally, fidelity 
may be a function of the morphological intimacy of the association, 
such as when the site of nutrient exchange involves the construc-
tion of nodules or arbuscules (greater morphological intimacy leads 
to greater fidelity). Fidelity is a parameter that can range from 0 to 
1, where 1 indicates that only the mutualist receives carbon, and 0 
indicates that the carbon is randomly distributed and is equally ac-
cessible by both mutualistic and nonmutualistic symbionts through 
scramble competition (Bever, 2015). These and all subsequent model 
terms are defined in Table 1.
It is assumed that there are energetic costs associated with being 
a mutualist, which reduce the growth rate of the mutualist relative 
to that of the nonmutualist (Bennett & Bever, 2009). The costs of 
provisioning host plants with nutrients are incurred both in the pres-
ence and absence of preferential allocation of carbon by the plant. 
In this model, the cost of mutualism, s, can range from 0 (no cost of 
mutualism) to 1 (complete cost of mutualism) (Bever, 2015).
These parameters were applied to a resource- ratio (R*) model of 
population growth. Based on Monod kinetics, this model describes 
resource- dependent growth to predict competitive interactions as a 
function of concentration of resources (Grover, 1997; Monod, 1950; 
Tilman, 1976). The resource- ratio model stipulates that there is a 
specific concentration of resources, denoted as R*, which is the lim-
iting level of a resource needed to keep population birth rate above a 
constant death rate. If the concentration of resources falls below R*, 
the population will collapse. In a competitive context, a species with 
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a lower R* can reduce the level of this essential resource below that 
of its competitor, resulting in the extinction of the latter. In this case, 
where the resource in question is carbon (C) the growth rates of the 
nonmutualist and the mutualist, respectively, are
and
Here, WN and WM are the per capita growth rates of the non-
mutualist and the mutualist, respectively. Per capita growth rate 
is affected by bmax, the maximum birth rate of each symbiont, 
which is reduced in the nonmutualist with increasing fidelity (f) of 
the plant to the mutualist, and is reduced for the mutualist due to 
costs (s) associated with provisioning host plants with nutrients. 
Additionally, f modifies the amount of C to which the nonmutualist 
has access, and thus occurs in the denominator in addition to the 
numerator in Equation 1. In accordance with Monod kinetics, k is the 
half- saturation constant and is always less than bmax. For both the 
mutualist and nonmutualist, d is the constant death rate. The per 
capita birth rates for the mutualist and the nonmutualist cross (i.e., 
WM=WN) when
By plugging Equation 3 into either of the per capita birth func-
tions, we find that the birth rate for the mutualist and nonmutualist 
at their point of intersection is
If the constant death rate, d, is above this point, then the nonmu-
tualist will always have a competitive advantage and the mutualist 
will decline to extinction. Mutualism is only possible when d is below 
this point. Rearranging this condition (see Appendix S1), we identify 
that the persistence of mutualism requires that the fidelity of plant 
investment,
This condition is more restrictive than in the absence of ex-
plicit consideration of resource dynamics (Bever, 2015). Given that 
bmax>d in order for any fungi to grow, the persistence of mutualism 
is only possible when bmaxs
bmax−d
 is less than 1, or the cost of mutualism
As in previous models, the mutualist and nonmutualist cannot 
coexist on one carbon source without negative physiological feed-
back (Bever, 2015) or negative community feedback (Steidinger & 
Bever, 2014).
We posit that when naïve plant roots first associate with sym-
bionts in the soil, plants must invest in the association by providing 
some amount of carbon in order for symbionts to enter the root 
and construct their physical relationship with the plant. This initial 
deposit of carbon is designated as Cc (construction carbon) and 
is a cost incurred by the plant from which both the mutualist and 
nonmutualist benefit. Once colonization of plant roots by symbi-
ont associates has occurred, the plant is able to recognize more 
beneficial partners and preferentially allocates carbon, Ca (alloca-
tion carbon), to these mutualists. While these two carbon sources 
are necessarily sequenced with construction preceding allocation, 
in the current model we represent these allocations as continuous 
investments, consistent with a growing plant root system. Thus, 

































TABLE  1 Description of model terms
Model term Definition
WM Growth rate of mutualist 
symbionts
WN Growth rate of 
nonmutualist 
symbionts
C Total carbon allocated to 
symbionts
f Fidelity of plant 
allocation to mutualist 
symbionts
s Cost of mutualism
bmax Maximum growth rate of 
symbionts
k Half- saturation constant
d Constant death rate
Cc Construction carbon 
that is allocated 
indiscriminately to 
symbionts to construct 
the site of symbiosis




C* Critical amount of 
carbon that sustains 
populations above the 
constant death rate (d)
Ĉ Amount of carbon that 
sustains populations at 
an equilibrium growth 
rate
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and
respectively, where CN=Cc+ (1− f)Ca and CM=Cc+Ca.
Because the density of both the nonmutualist and the mutualist 
depends on carbon obtained from the plant, there is a limiting level 
of carbon necessary to sustain the populations. In other words, there 
is a critical amount of carbon, C*, which keeps births of symbionts 
above a constant death rate, d. Should C* fall below d, the popula-
tion will collapse. The critical levels for both sources of carbon (that 
used to construct the symbiont–plant mutualism and that used to 
preferentially reward the mutualist) can be obtained by solving for 
the equilibrium growth rate of each symbiont, that is, the condition 
in which WN=0 and WM=0 (see Appendix S1). Thus, at equilibrium,
and
Consequently, by assuming that Ca and Cc are completely inter-
changeable, and that they comprise 100% of the symbionts’ carbon 
source, it can be determined that for the nonmutualist
and
Similarly, for the mutualist,
and
When we consider competition for construction carbon and 
allocation carbon in isolation from one another, we find that the 
nonmutualist outcompetes the mutualist for construction carbon 
(C*N < C*M ) due to the cost of mutualism borne to the mutualist 
(Figure 1). On the other hand, the mutualist outcompetes the non-
mutualist for preferentially allocated carbon (C*M < C*N ) (Figure 1).
However, because these two separate carbon resources are 
substitutable, competitive outcomes are determined by the ratio 
in which the two resources are supplied. In the complete absence 







 (see Equations 11 and 






 are plotted on two separate axes, a zero 








 (see Equations 13 and 14), which results in a 
ZNGI with a slope of −1 (Figure 2a; see Appendix S1). These ZNGIs 
are parallel but not identical, because the cost of mutualism to the 
mutualist results in a higher ZNGI. Thus, in this scenario, the nonmu-
tualist will always have competitive superiority.














 are plotted on 
two separate axes, the ZNGI has a slope of −1
(1−f)
 (see Appendix S1) 
which then intersects with the ZNGI for the mutualist (which still 
has a slope of −1; Figure 2b). Consumption vectors, which represent 
the change in resource availability due to consumption, were placed 
perpendicular to each ZNGI to indicate that allocated carbon and 
construction carbon are consumed in proportion to their availability 
to the mutualist and the nonmutualist, since symbionts cannot dis-
criminate among sources of carbon. Thus, the mutualist depletes Ca 
and Cc equally, and the nonmutualist depletes Cc more than it does 
Ca, due not to fundamental differences in the rate of consumption of 
these interchangeable carbon sources, but their availability to each 
symbiont (Figure 2b).
Thus, by examining Equations 5–6 and 11–14, it can be inferred 
that if there is some cost of mutualism (s>0), the nonmutualist 






Furthermore, if degree of fidelity, f> bmaxs
bmax−d
, then the mutualist will 





































































F IGURE  1 The nonmutualist outcompetes the mutualist for 
construction carbon (C*N < C*M) due to the cost of mutualism borne 
to the mutualist. The mutualist outcompetes the nonmutualist for 
preferentially allocated carbon (C*M < C*N), due to the fidelity of the 
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coexistence for the nonmutualist and mutualist (Figure 2b), whereby 
coexistence is possible when
3  | DISCUSSION
There is a longstanding paradox regarding how mutualistic in-
teractions persist in the face of cheating, and a more recent re-
structuring of this paradox to ask how variation in partner quality 
persists in nature (Foster & Kokko, 2006; Heath & Stinchcombe, 
2014). Our model demonstrates that resource competition cou-
pled with preferential allocation may facilitate coexistence of 
plant root mutualists and nonmutualists, provided there are two 
carbon sources. Specifically, our model allows fidelity of the plant 
to the mutualist and the cost of mutualism to mediate competitive 
ability of the symbionts.
A central assumption of our model is that carbon constitutes two 
limiting resources. Our model has two nutritionally interchangeable, 
but temporally separated resource axes: carbon utilized for estab-
lishment of the symbiosis (e.g., construction of an arbuscule), and 
carbon preferentially allocated by the plant following symbiont es-
tablishment and assessment. In order for a plant to evaluate whether 
a symbiont is beneficial or nonbeneficial, the association must first 
be established and exchange must be initiated. As a result, the plant 
must pay a “start- up cost” of carbon to the symbionts prior to the 
initiation of preferential allocation. Both the mutualist and the non-
mutualist benefit from this carbon, which is distributed indiscrimi-
nately by the plant. Regardless of the benefit that the mutualist will 
eventually confer, the nonmutualist is a better competitor for this 
resource (i.e., has a lower C*c than the mutualist) because it more 
efficiently converts this resource into its own growth. This advan-
tage could be the simple consequence of not investing in costly re-
source exchange, but alternatively could also be due to secondary 
specialization on the indiscriminately allocated carbon, such as by 
increasing rates of dispersal or establishment to capture more of the 
plant’s initial investment. Thus, in the absence of preferential allo-
cation, the nonmutualist will always have a competitive advantage. 
On the other hand, by engaging in nutrient exchange with the plant, 
the mutualist is able to outcompete the nonmutualist for the carbon 
that is subsequently preferentially allocated by the plant. The mutu-
alist will have a lower C*a than the nonmutualist and thus is a better 
competitor on the allocated carbon axis. Therefore, in the presence 













) for allocated carbon, allowing for 
coexistence.
The carbon in this system originates solely from translocated 
photosynthate, but our model differentiates between carbon that 
is allocated first indiscriminately and then discriminately by the 
plant, such that time is an implicit assumption within the model. 
As such, these separate but substitutable carbon resources are 
temporal in nature, rather than compositional, which is consistent 






F IGURE  2 Competitive dynamics of the nonmutualist and mutualist competing for construction and allocation carbon. (a) In the absence 















which results in a ZNGI with a slope of −1, but which is higher than the nonmutualist ZNGI because of the cost of mutualism. In this scenario, 







, creating a ZNGI for the 
nonmutualist with a slope of −1
(1−f)
. The mutualist and nonmutualist ZNGIs cross such that C*cN < C*cM and C*aM < C*aN, allowing for a condition 
for coexistence of mutualist and nonmutualist symbionts. Dotted lines represent consumption vectors, which are placed perpendicular to 
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preferential allocation by the plant host Allium vineale (wild onion) 
to mutualistic and nonmutualistic arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi 
demonstrated that in the presence of increasing soil phosphorous 
levels, the amount of carbon preferentially allocated to the mu-
tualist decreased from ~35% of total allocated carbon to ~10%, 
whereas the amount of carbon allocated to the nonmutualist re-
mained at a constant level of 10% of total allocated carbon (Ji & 
Bever, 2016). Using the same host plant, another study showed 
that a nonmutualist received a constant 11% of total allocated 
carbon, whereas a mutualist received 15%–25% of total carbon, 
depending on the amount of shade present (shading decreased 
preferential allocation to mutualists; Zheng et al., 2015). In these 
empirical examples, construction carbon would be included within 
the basal level of carbon allocated to both the nonmutualist and 
the mutualist, and the plant could then allocate additional carbon 
to the mutualist, depending on resource availability (e.g., phos-
phorous, light) and how reliant the plant was on the mutualist for 
nutrient uptake (Ji & Bever, 2016; Zheng et al., 2015). In the afore-
mentioned greenhouse studies of Allium vineale, it appears that 
~20% of the plant’s carbon budget is used indiscriminately for root 
maintenance and construction of new arbuscules, half of which is 
captured by the nonmutualist and half by the mutualist. In gen-
eral, it is likely that the availability of construction carbon would 
vary given the environment and the species involved in the inter-
action, but within a particular context, the carbon used for initial 
construction of symbioses would remain constant. Preferentially 
allocated carbon, however, would be more plastic depending on 
environmental conditions. Therefore, the amount of preferentially 
allocated carbon available to the mutualist could shift along its 
axis, resulting in three possible competitive outcomes at a given 
level of construction carbon (Figure 2b): (1) If preferentially al-
located carbon were low, the nonmutualist would competitively 
exclude the mutualist; (2) after a threshold level of allocated car-
bon (determined by the resource axes) was reached, coexistence 
would be possible; and (3) if the degree of preferential allocation 
were sufficiently high, there would be competitive exclusion of 
the nonmutualist by the mutualist. Previous results demonstrate 
that preferentially allocated carbon decreases with increasing soil 
phosphorous (Ji & Bever, 2016) and with shade (Zheng et al., 2015) 
as might be expected from plant nutrition. Together, this predicts 
broad conditions for coexistence with environmental patterns of 
relative abundance of mutualists to nonmutualists.
By integrating resource competition between symbionts into 
our model, we derive a condition for mutualism that is more gen-
erous than that of Bever (2015). This is because the fidelity of the 
plant to the mutualist taxes the saturation of the nonmutualist per 
capita birth rate (Equation 1). Biologically, this implies that due to 
host fidelity, the mutualist is able to achieve a higher birth rate at 
lower levels of carbon than expected in Bever (2015). Thus, even in 
the face of considerable and clearly documented costs to mutualists 
(Bronstein, 2001), fidelity of the plant to more mutualistic symbionts 
can act as a stabilizing mechanism for mutualism. The role of host 
fidelity in symbiont resource competition is supported by empirical 
studies. Greenhouse studies using arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi have 
shown that spatial structure of symbionts within plant root systems 
can facilitate the ease of partner choice by the plant such that mutu-
alists receive more carbon and have a higher growth rate than non-
mutualists (Bever et al., 2009). In nature, communities of arbuscular 
mycorrhizal fungi exhibit spatial structuring and clustering even at 
extremely small spatial scales (Davison et al., 2016; Horn, Caruso, 
Verbruggen, Rillig, & Hempel, 2014; Verbruggen et al., 2012). 
Additionally, in plant–rhizobia systems, selection should favor dis-
honest signaling of rhizobia quality (Heath & Tiffin, 2009), so plants 
do not know the efficacy of prospective rhizobial colonizers a priori. 
This means that nonmutualistic bacteria colonize alongside more 
cooperative bacteria (Denison & Kiers, 2011). Plants, however, may 
subsequently reward effective rhizobia (Batstone, Dutton, Wang, 
Yang, & Frederickson, 2017) or impose partner sanctions on ineffec-
tive bacteria to enforce mutualism (West, Kiers, Simms, & Denison, 
2002) at multiple spatial scales (Kiers et al., 2003). However, ac-
cording to our model, when the costs of mutualism are too high (see 
Equation 6), mutualism is never a viable lifestyle even in the absence 
of competition with a nonmutualist. Thus, our model provides clear 
conditions for the coexistence of multiple root symbionts.
Even though our model shows that coexistence is possible 
within certain parameter space, these conditions alone do not nec-
essarily explain why coexistence is so common in nature (Bever, 
Schultz, Pringle, & Morton, 2001). For example, in a boreo- nemoral 
forest in Estonia, 10 plant species hosted a total of 47 arbuscu-
lar mycorrhizal taxa (Öpik, Metsis, Daniell, Zobel, & Moora, 2009). 
Even in an agricultural monoculture of sorghum, up to twelve spe-
cies of arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi have been shown to coexist on 
a single crop (Schenck & Kinloch, 1980). However, our approach 
of coupling resource competition and preferential allocation, or in 
other words the concept that consumers compete for a good, and 
the supplier preferentially provides the good to the consumer that 
pays more, is compatible with the recent application of biological 
market theory to plantroot symbioses (Kiers et al., 2016; Kummel 
& Salant, 2006; Werner et al., 2014; Wyatt, Kiers, Gardner, & West, 
2014). According to biological market theory, the volatility of biotic 
or abiotic conditions may drive the demand for specialized services 
and could even change which symbiont is considered the best qual-
ity partner in a system. Such variation would almost certainly alter 
preferential allocation of resources (Werner & Kiers, 2015), and a 
market that experiences frequent fluctuations would more likely 
maintain, on average, intermediate allocation levels. According to 
our model, intermediate levels of preferential allocation would lead 
to coexistence and the maintenance of variation in the mutualism. 
In contrast to biological market models, which only predict coex-
istence of symbionts under limited conditions (Kummel & Salant, 
2006), our model easily explains both limitation of spread of non-
beneficial symbionts and their coexistence with mutualists by fo-
cusing on microbial competition. A level of preferential allocation 
low enough to competitively exclude the mutualist would poten-
tially be biologically plausible if the resources being exchanged 
were freely available (Ji & Bever, 2016). This is consistent with the 
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predictions of the negative physiological feedback model (Bever, 
2015), which predicts that cheaters would potentially decline to 
zero with increasing resource availability. However, in many ter-
restrial ecosystems, nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorous 
are limiting to the growth of plants (Vitousek, Porder, Houlton, 
& Chadwick, 2010). For instance, tropical soils are phosphorous- 
limited and are also characterized by diverse communities of coex-
isting arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (Janos, 1980). Moreover, plants 
could be selecting for coexistence of root symbionts (Moeller & 
Neubert, 2015), as associating with multiple mutualists may be 
beneficial for plant health and fitness. Increasing species richness 
of arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi has been shown to increase plant 
biodiversity, nutrient capture and productivity (van der Heijden 
et al., 1998), as well as plant growth (Koomen, Grace, & Hayman, 
1987), although this effect may be due to increased likelihood of 
inclusion of particularly beneficial arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi 
(Vogelsang, Reynolds, & Bever, 2006).
Our model has been designed and interpreted primarily in the 
context of the specific interaction between plants and root symbi-
onts, such as arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi and rhizobia, but could 
hold relevance for other mutualisms with a “pay- first, evaluate- later” 
dynamic. For instance, in mutualisms between plants and pollinat-
ing seed consumers (i.e., the yucca- yucca moth and fig–fig wasp 
mutualisms), pollinators compete for host resources, but hosts can 
choose to allocate more resources to successfully pollinated fruits 
(in the case of figs, Jandér & Herre, 2016), or abort inadequately 
pollinated flowers (in the case of yucca, Huth & Pellmyr, 2000). In 
these systems, resources distributed to fruits or flowers before and 
after pollination would be analogous to our model’s construction and 
allocation carbon terms, respectively. Previous research has shown 
that the intensity of sanctioning by fig hosts correlates negatively 
with the number of nonmutualists in a system (Jandér & Herre, 
2010), which supports our theoretical finding that when host fidel-
ity is high and the cost of mutualism is low, competing mutualists 
and nonmutualists can coexist. Conversely, this model may be less 
relevant to ant–plant mutualisms, in which plants provide domatia 
(structures that ants can live inside) and extrafloral nectaries or food 
bodies. In return, ants defend the plant from herbivores or compet-
itors and thus promote the growth of large plants, which can then 
provide more resources to the resident ant colony, increasing ant 
colony growth (Frederickson & Gordon, 2009). Because only a single 
ant colony typically resides on a single plant, this positive feedback 
between plant and ant colony growth makes cheating an inviable 
strategy for either partner (Jones et al., 2015) and nullifies the need 
to pay first and then evaluate. Our model may also be irrelevant to 
the squid- Vibrio mutualism, which relies on a rigorous progression of 
colonization occurring in a series of stages, in which each step con-
fers greater specificity between the host and the symbiont (Nyholm 
& McFall- Ngai, 2004). This “obstacle course” effectively excludes 
Vibrio cheaters and cosmopolitan bacteria from colonizing (Leigh, 
2010).
Overall, we demonstrate a condition for root symbiont co-
existence when symbionts compete for plant carbon, and plants 
preferentially allocate some of that carbon to mutualists. We treated 
carbon as two nutritionally interchangeable, but temporally sep-
arated resources—carbon indiscriminately allocated to initial con-
struction and evaluation of the symbiosis, and carbon preferentially 
allocated to the best mutualist after symbiosis establishment. Our 
results are consistent with previous empirical studies as well as an 
emerging literature on the application of biological market theory 
to plantroot symbioses. This model does not consider processes 
such as physiological feedbacks between partners and hosts, which 
could expand the conditions for coexistence of symbionts varying in 
benefit. Moreover, our model treats mutualists and nonmutualists 
as binary and does not account for symbiont variation along the mu-
tualism–parasitism spectrum. Under a more realistic model, it may 
be easier to predict how colonization by a community of symbiotic 
partners or various selection pressures may alter mutualistic strat-
egies (Wyatt et al., 2014). While empirical work is necessary to test 
basic assumptions and predictions, our model adds a new dimension 
of biological complexity, resource competition, to previous theoret-
ical work, and strengthens our understanding of the maintenance of 
variation in mutualism.
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